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Is THE RULE OF LAW COSMOPOLITAN?
By Robin West

Aunt Sally and Huck, after a steamboat accident:
"Good gracious! anybody hurt?
"No'm. Killed a nigger."
"Well, it's lucky; because sometimes people do get hurt."!

I. INTRODUCTION

In a short and artful essay that evoked a blaze of criticism, I Martha
Nussbaum urged us a few years ago to heed the ancient call for a
virtuous and humane cosmopolitanism: if we are sincere in our societal
commitment to justice, and genuine in our individual quest to lead a just
and good life, then we must acknowledge the moral equality-the equal
2
worth and equal dignity-of each and all of the world's inhabitants.
This claim, if true and if seriously regarded, would have profound
consequences. Individual, national and communal choices and actions,
Nussbaum and her classical authorities say, must, to be just, be
undertaken in full and equal regard for the consequences they impose
upon all-not just upon our community, our tribe, our nation, our
neighbors, our friends, those we see or hear from on a daily basis, or
those to whom we have ties forged of blood, genes, geography,
affection, common boundaries or shared traditions-but upon all. It is
as wrong to give greater weight to the claims of co-nationals as to give
greater weight, in the arena of justice, to the claims of those who share
our skin color, ethnicity, religion or surname. Although the pull of
sentiment, of love, of sympathy, and even of compassion may be
particularistic, partial, tribal, familial or nationalistic, the claim of
justice is universal. When we act justly, we act in full regard of the
humanity and moral worth of all the world's citizens.

t MARK TwAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 279 (W. Blair & V.
Fieher eds., 1985).
1. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF
COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 1 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).
2. See id. at 12-14.
259
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I want to baldly assume for purposes of this paper that Martha
Nussbaum is right about this-although I will briefly suggest one line of
response to some of the criticisms made against her at the end of this
paper. Primarily, though, I want to elaborate on a possible implication
of her thesis. The question I want to take up is this: If Nussbaum is
right to argue that justice requires ethical cosmopolitanism, and if
justice is the virtue both required by and furthered by the rule of law,
then doesn't the legal profession's defining ethical commitment to the
rule of law in tum commit us to ethical cosmopolitanism? If justice
requires cosmopolitanism, and if the rule of law promotes or is intended
to promote justice, then our profession's commitment to the rule of law,
if genuine, should commit us to cosmopolitanism as well. If so, then
lawyers, distinctively, should be ethical cosmopolitans. Put differently,
if justice requires cosmopolitanism, and the rule of law promotes
justice, then lawyers, by virtue of our professional identity, are or
should be constitutively committed to the egalitarianism and
universalism that undergirds both cosmopolitanism and the rule of law.
It is not at all obvious, however, that the justice that arguably
requires ethical cosmopolitanism is the justice furthered and required by
the rule of law, or even that it bears a family resemblance to it. It may
tum out, for example, that it is a social, or political, or global, or
Rawlsian, or just peculiarly cosmopolitan sense of justice that requires
cosmopolitanism, and that that justice, although surely connected in
some way to the justice dispensed by international tribunals, is entirely
unrelated to the sort of justice ideally dispensed by domestic courts and
furthered by a national rule of law. It may be, in other words, that the
egalitarianism and universalism required by cosmopolitanism are not in
any sense connected to the recognition of the moral equality of citizens
that the rule of law seems to require of lawful societies-and may even
be antithetical to it. If so then lawyers qua lawyers are off the hook. If
these two senses of justice are simply unrelated, then it may still be, as
Martha Nussbaum insists, that all of us, by virtue of being human
beings, should be ethical cosmopolitans.
But then our further
professional identity as lawyers adds nothing to our moral obligations to
the world's citizens.
My guess, however, is to the contrary. Although they are certainly
not identical, I think there is an important connection between the
justice that Nussbaum and others think requires ethical
cosmopolitanism, and the justice toward which law-and lawyeringaspire. It is not, though, an iron-clad connection. Rather, what I will
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argue in the bulk of the paper is that whether or not the rule of law
implies ethical cosmopolitanism depends: it depends on how we
understand or interpret the legalistic sense of justice that law and the
rule of law seemingly require. The virtue that we sometimes call legal
justice, and the correlative meaning of the rule of law to which it is
yoked, can plausibly be subjected to a range of different interpretations,
each resting on quite different understandings of the point of law and of
what the individual law is meant to protect.
Some of these
interpretations do, but some don't, imply some verSIOn of
cosmopolitanism.
After disentangling different meanings of legal justice and of the
rule of law, I then want to argue that at least one widely held
interpretation of legal justice-a loosely Kantian understanding, which I
will describe as both egalitarian and communitarian-does imply the
ethical cosmopolitanism for which Nussbaum has argued. There is,
then, at least this limited sense in which the rule of law is cosmopolitan:
at least one understanding (among others) of the virtue specifically
furthered by law and legal fidelity requires it. And if that is right and if
the understanding of justice on which it rests is at all robust, then it is
not only our status as moral beings that should compel us toward world
citizenship, and the ethical cosmopolitanism for which Professor
Nussbaum has argued. Our status as lawyers and legal educators--our
professional sense of ourselves as partly constituted by but also
committed to rule of law values, and so committed by virtue of our
professional status-should do so as well.
Finally, if that is right, then something is very wrong with the way
we in the United States think about and teach about law. As things
currently stand, American understanding of the ideals law furthers and
the virtues it promotes could not be further from such an ethic. Rather,
the jurisprudential ideals that American lawyers hold out for our law,
and the virtues we assume are furthered by respect for law, are almost
entirely parochial, and for the most part, we teach and think about those
ideals and virtues as though that is as it should be. What I want to
suggest at the end of this paper is the possibility that we need to rethink
that assurance. If the justice that we claim to honor and further with the
rule of law is the justice we so resolutely deny in our interrelations with
the world's co-citizens---co-citizens whose lives are often adversely
affected by our reckless disregard of their existence, much less their
interests-then we are guilty of an hypocrisy at least as great as Aunt
Sally's, and, perhaps more to the point, at least as great as the hypocrisy
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of the founding fathers of the Constitution in their disastrous and
contradictory endorsement of natural equality and the superiority of the
white race. And, our legalistic hypocrisy, like theirs, has consequences.
It leaves our egalitarian ideals for law-the equality we think law
guarantees; the respect for humanity we think it engenders-so riddled
with exceptions that they become incoherent, and thereby easily lost and
forgotten. It leaves the best possible interpretation of these treasured
egalitarian legal aspirations-the majesty of the Fourteenth
Amendment; the sweep of our commitments to equality, and so forthin tatters. Like Aunt Sally's casual asides, those legal gems-meant to
express our generosity, our compassion, and our equal regard and
concern for our kinfolk and neighbors-instead, unintentionally, express
our reckless cruelty.
II. THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL JUSTICE: CURRENT
UNDERSTANDINGS

Whatever else the rule of law requires of us, virtually all judges,
most lawyers and most lay people agree that it requires what
jurisprudential scholars call "horizontal equity": judges must treat like
cases alike. Similar cases must be decided similarly. This only
seemingly banal and simple constraint has been expressed in a number
of ways. Judicial decisions must, to use Dworkin's formulation of this
basic intuition, have integrity.3 Cases must be decided in accordance
with a scheme of rights, and what that means above all else, for
Dworkin, is that if case A or litigant A is like case B or litigant B in all
4
similar respects then A must be treated like B. According to Scalia's
formulation of the same basic point, judges cannot flip-flop, or decide
cases arbitrarily, or by whim, or by personal predilection. The rule of
law requires a law of rules, and a law of rules in tum requires that like
cases be decided similarly, in accordance with a rule that so describes
5
them. According to Herbert Wechsler, to draw from an influential midcentury articulation of the same idea, decisions must be principled, and
again this turns out to mean not much more than that cases that are in
principle similar must be decided in the same way, regardless of the

3. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986).
4. See id. at 217-19.
5. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv.
1175,1178-79(1989).
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judge's personal predilection to the contrary.6 More recently, Cass
Sunstein has explicitly identified analogical reasoning as the heart of
law, defining it, in part, as the requirement that "judgments about
specific cases must be made consistent with one another.,,7 The
requirement that like cases be treated alike, again virtually all judges
and most theorists seemingly agree, is a very real and consequential
limit on judgment. It limits options and it limits-in the minds of some
it even eliminates-untoward discretion.
As is also widely acknowledged, however, at least in law schools if
not on the bench, the basic coherence of this mandate that "like cases be
treated alike" has been the subject of a one-hundred-year-Iong critical
attack, in the first half of the century by the American Legal Realists
and in the second half by the Critical Legal Studies Movement. Much
of that criticism has been well-founded. It is certainly true, as scores of
critical thinkers insist, that the judgment that two cases are alike, or that
two people are alike, or that two situations are alike, logically depends
upon a prior judgment, claim, premise, gestalt, gut instinct, prejudice,
Zeitgeist, or entire world view, stated or unstated, that renders the
shared characteristics noticeable, much less relevant or central to the
outcome. That a menstruating woman is enough like a man that it is
unjust to exclude her from civic, economic, or religious life simply
because she is menstruating is not self-evidene it requires a judgment
that they both share in the capacity for reason or productivity despite
their obvious biological differences; or it requires a judgment that
menstrual blood does not pollute; or a judgment that fertile and bleeding
women can engage in the work of citizenship or productivity or
spirituality. That an injured hand crippled in a botched surgical
proceeding is enough like a broken machine part and that the surgeon's
broken promise to fix it is enough like a broken promise of a
manufacturer to deliver a machine part to a factory, that justice requires
that the injury to the hand be compensated through a contract rule
familiar to merchants rather than a tort rule familiar to relational actors,
is also not self-evident; it rests on a prior belief, or world-view, that
regards surgical services as commodities and surgeons as sellers, and
even more generally, that regards all of our social interactions and
6. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REv. I, 11 (1959).
7. Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741, 782 (1993).
8. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings, in
WOMEN, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 64, 96-104 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan
Glover eds., 1995).
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relationships as fungible if idealized bargained exchanges in an
industrial and post-industrial economy.9 To hold that an employer who
discharges without job related cause pregnant school teachers merely
because they are pregnant has not violated a general prohibition against
sex discrimination because the judgment that pregnant women are
unlike nonpregnant men and women is unlike the impermissible
judgment that women generally are unlike men, rests on a claim, or
world view, committed to the proposition that the condition of
pregnancy radically differentiates the pregnant woman from the general
condition of humanity in a way that is in turn unlike the impermissible
belief that women per se are unlike men.1O For any of these decisions to
be made on the bare grounds that menstruating women are the same or
different from non-menstruating persons, or that an injured hand is like
or unlike a broken machine part, or that pregnant schoolteachers are
unlike non-pregnant persons in a way that is in turn unlike the ways in
which women are wrongly perceived to be unlike men, without
elucidation of the underlying claims that make these similarities and
dissimilarities even noticeable, much less compelling, is, as the critics
have said now for almost a hundred years, arbitrariness posing as
rationality. The syllogistic claim that A is like B, and must therefore be
decided like B, is simply arrogant, or at best unthinking, and it is never
rational, where the case for the similarity and its normative relevance is
muted or masked by appeals to logic, formalism, or rule of law virtues.
Herculean, and by no means wasted, effort has gone into the century
long task of forcing the judicial craftsman to come clean with these
prior and often hidden judgments of fact and value: to state them
clearly, defend them where need be, and to change them when they
become indefensible.
This one-hundred-year critical insistence on enhanced rationality,
however, has not demonstrably reduced the strength of the widely
shared moral intuition that like cases must be decided alike; indeed, if
anything, it rests on and enhances it. American legal realism, whatever
its flaws, has driven home the point that the case for similarity must be
made, and not assumed or left undefended, and critical legal
scholarship, whatever its flaws, has driven home the point that the case
for similarity, once made, will almost undoubtedly rest on judgments of
value and not just judgments of natural fact. Nevertheless, at the end of
9. See Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
10. See Gedu1dig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that pregnancy
classification is not gender classification).
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the day, it is as clear as it ever was that similarities and dissimilarities,
once articulated and defended, and whether of fact or value, do matter:
they do, once determined, drive the legal decision. Put differently, it is
as true today as it was when Langdell first built hi~ science on it, that
the essence of legal reasoning is analogical. It is what we do as lawyers
and judges, and what we teach as law professors, at least so long as we
focus on the work of courts. If we take seriously the teachings of the
realists and the critical scholars, then we will do it better, and it is
perhaps the case that we will do it in a way that bears only a family
resemblance to the analogical reasoning Langdell initially described:
unlike Euclid's axioms, legal axioms must be defended and subject to
change. But it nevertheless remains the case that analogical reasoning is
what we do. It is still the heart of legal education, the heart of legal
reasoning, and the rock bottom agreed upon content of the constraint on
judgment imposed by the rule of law.
It is sensible to ask, then, what lies behind this extraordinarily
resilient insistence that like cases be decided alike, or by rule, or in a
principled manner. One plausible response-which Cass Sunstein has
argued over the last few years-is that what lies behind it is a credible
and creative and distinctive form of analogical reasoning that carries
with it a number of virtues, the most notable of which, perhaps, is that it
facilitates muddling through: it allows us to accomplish the work of
decision-making in a complex and pluralistic society without agreement
on basic principles. I I I'm not at all sure this "muddling through"
argument is a response, rather than capitulation, to the claims of critics
but I want to suggest another sort of answer, not incompatible with
Sunstein's defense of analogical reasoning but also not dependent upon
it. It may be that what lies behind the durability of analogical reasoning
in legal contexts is not an "idea" at all, much less a loosely felt
allegiance to what is in fact, appearances notwithstanding, an intelligent,
pragmatic, and even progressive way to make decisions. It may be that
what lies behind the durability of analogical reasoning is an ethical
imperative, and that the ethical imperative it expresses is the demand of
legal justice.
Could it be that simple? Consider this: no matter how shaky,
contingent, undefended, political,
personalized, idiosyncratic,
psychically determined, socially constructed, widely shared or foolish
be the world view that sustains perceptions of sameness and difference,
11. See Casso R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REV. 741,782
(\ 993).
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we are nevertheless mightily offended when like cases, no matter how
that likeness has come to be determined, are then decided differently.
And we are mightily offended because such decisions feel, distinctively,
unjust. That Bill Clinton keeps his job while Kelly Flinn gets fired
seems unjust; these cases are alike in at least some ways which suggest
the need for equal treatment, even if it is the case that the impeachment
of Bill Clinton for a morals offense would be a constitutional travesty,
as well as an unjust differentiation between him and virtually every
president of this century that has preceded him. Even if women who are
menstruating are incapable of acts of reason, productivity, spiritual
purity, or citizenship, then it is unjust to admit this menstruating
woman, but not that one. If there is no sustainable difference between
menstruating women and non-menstruating men and women then it is
unjust to exclude them. It is unjust to acquit 0.1. Simpson when others
have been convicted on lesser evidence; it is unjust to sentence a
murderous husband to only ten months work release for killing his
adulterous wife in an "act of passion," three hours after finding her in
bed with another man, as a Maryland judge did a few years ago on the
expressed grounds that killing an adulterous wife should not be regarded
as criminal,12 when others who kill with far greater provocation (namely,
they are in fear of their lives) are sentenced to much longer terms;13 and
it is unjust not to compensate the botched hand through a contract
remedy if its true that a promise is a promise is a promise, whether it be
commercial, familial, professional or relational.
The injustice in any of these cases might be felt to be even greater
if one concurs wholeheartedly in the world view that motivates the
claim of sameness and difference. But it is surely a sign of the
importance of the basic intuition that we feel the demands of legal
justice even where the background world view seems wrong-headed or
bizarre. Thus, even if we wholeheartedly believe that it is a scandalous
waste to engage in sexual McCarthyism, and would view the
impeachment of Clinton for a moral offense as the functional equivalent
of a fundamentalist religious coup, it still rankles, should Clinton
survive in his job while others charged with similar and lesser offenses
do not. Even if we abhor the commercialization of relational life, we
see the injustice of responding to some but not others of those wrongly
12. See Karl Vick, Maryland Judge Taking Heat in Cuckolded Killer Case, WASH.
Oct. 30, 1994, at AI.
13. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem Law Reform and the
Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1331-32 (1997).
POST,
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commercialized relations--of enforcing contracts for personal services,
14
but not for reproductive or sexual services, for example. Even if we
oppose punitive incarceration across the board, it nevertheless feels
unjust that OJ. Simpson is free. Even if we passionately oppose the
death penalty, it nevertheless is and feels unjust that those who kill
black rather than white victims rarely receive it. IS It may be, in other
words, that it is legal justice that requires that like cases be decided
alike, and that it is because it is justice that so requires, and not just an
outmoded formalism, or a hobgoblinish demand for consistency, or a
fetishistic attraction to the comforts of authority, or, more
sympathetically, a justified allegiance to a muddling pragmatic mode of
reasoning, that our insistence that like cases be decided alike has
survived the one-hundred-year long critical assault on the idea's basic
coherence.
But if so, this does not end the matter, it only pushes the question
in a different direction: What is the ethical content of a legal justice that
so demands? There is, I think, surprisingly little scholarship in law
directed to this inquiry, but, nevertheless, one can discern at least three
different accounts, each of which corresponds, roughly, with a fairly
distinct and well-developed understanding of the point of law, and of
the human being, or the "individual," that law is designed to protect.
The first of these three is traditionalist, the second, libertarian, and the
third, communitarian and egalitarian. It is this last understanding, and
only this last understanding, which demands of us an ethical
cosmopolitanism like the one Martha Nussbaum defends in her essay.
Let me quickly rehearse the first two, which I think are familiar, and
then focus on the last, which, although perhaps the most familiar to
philosophers, is the least well developed of the three in legal
scholarship. The reason for that neglect, I hope, should become clear.
The first possible account of legal justice-for the insistence that
like cases be treated alike-is traditionalist and has received its
strongest modern defense in an important article on stare decisis by
Dean Anthony Kronman. 16 On Kronman's account, judges should treat
like cases alike, because to do so preserves the legal structures of the
14. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J.
56 (1993); Mrujorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model
for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204, 209 (1982).
15. See Randall L. Kennedy, McKlesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and
the Supreme Coun, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1388, 1395-1402 (1988).
16. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE LJ. 1029, 1041
(1990).
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past, and preservation of the legal structures of the past is itself a very
good thing "for its own sake." Of course, everyone might agree that
preserving the legal structure of the past is a good thing to whatever
degree those legal structures are good structures that rest on sound
judgments. But this hardly justifies a strong sense of stare decisis or of
legal justice; it justifies following precedent only so long as the
particular precedent is sound. Rather, Kronman argues, the case for
stare decisis must rest on the goodness of preserving the legal structures
of the past regardless of their content. That, he argues, is a good thing
to do, basically because preservation of all socially constructed
structures of the past is a good thing: it is good to maintain continuity
with past generations and past traditions. 17 The preservationist instinct
is essential to the work of creating and maintaining a distinctive (and
distinctively human) culture. Preservation of our cultural pastincluding our legal past-gives us both communal and individual
identity.
It is both the culture preserved and the act of preserving it,
Kronman goes on to argue, that distinguish us from the mass of bulbous,
pulsating, biological, lived-in-the-moment forms of animal life. Andit is also the preserved culture that distinguishes us from the mass of
undifferentiated human life on the rest of the globe as well. We recreate ourselves generationally by declaring and redeclaring our loyalty
and even our identity with our ancestors, with their "way of life," and
with the legal structures they have in tum inherited, valued and
preserved. By yoking ourselves to our past, we create by reaffirming
our identity. The implicitly conservative moral impulse behind the
mandate of legal justice, on this view, is the legal equivalent of the
conservative moral impulse behind the museum curator's mandate to
preserve a society's high art. In both cases, the society's present
inhabitants are served and its ancestors are honored by forging bonds
between them, and the bonds consist of the preserved and treasured
cultural and legal artifacts that define the shared society. The mandate
of legal justice is a mandated respect for the legal traditions of the past.
This traditional understanding of the impulse of legal justice is
obviously compatible with a traditional, "status-oriented," or "precontract" conception of the point of law itself. Indeed Kronman's
account has the distinct virtue of first articulating and then defending the
deeply conservative nature of adjudicated law: adjudication, conceived

17.

See id. at 1036-37,1065-68.
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as the task of deciding like cases alike, must proceed from and then
respect and preserve given intuitions, traditions, or convictions, if it is to
be just, and thus unquestionably runs the risk of unduly valorizing the
status quo. This conservatism, however, Kronman makes quite clear, is
precisely why we should value stare decisis, not run from it. The law
shelters tradition, and to honor the law, we must preserve those
traditions. The structures and statuses and relationships they define and
the law protects-whether they be structures of master and servant,
innkeeper and traveler, husband and wife, parent and child, or merchant
and buyer-define social life and individual identity both. We protect
those structures, statuses, and relationships, by treating likes alike: by
treating servants alike, masters alike, merchants alike, husbands alike,
etc, we preserve the relationships themselves as social entities that
survive particular instantiations across time. The rule of precedent
preserves the traditions, and preserving the traditions in tum reaffirms a
conception of human identity defined by those traditions. Honoring the
rule of precedent thus honors a traditionalist account of law, of society,
and of legal justice.
This traditional account of the rule of precedent, of legal justice
and the rule of law, is not simply non-cosmopolitan; it is anticosmopolitan. The very point of precedent, and of law, so understood,
is to forge a cultural or national identity separate and distinct from
undifferentiated humanity; it is to create and maintain bonds of civic
obligation distinctively grounded in particularistic tradition rather than
in universal essence. We treat likes alike-masters like masters,
servants like servants, one promise backed by consideration like another
promise backed by consideration-because by doing so we create,
affirm and differentiate particular and shared identities, and by doing so,
we create, affirm and differentiate our culture from all others. We do all
of this, in part, through law. Law should be valued, then, not only and
not primarily because it handily insures order, safety, a less brutal,
longer, and possibly freer life for all, but precisely because it wards off
the danger of a creeping cosmopolitan universalism-a universalism
that threatens our national identity, and hence our human and cultural
identity, profoundly.
The second possible understanding of the moral constraint of
formal justice that undergirds the insistence that likes be treated alike,
Kronman call "utilitarian," but I think is better labeled libertarian: on
this view, like cases must be decided alike because to do so increases
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the decisional liberty of the choosing individual. 's A rational body of
law is more predictable than an irrational body of law, and a predictable
sanction leaves the individual with more freedom than an unpredictable
one: law is a net increase in liberty over the chaos of the state of nature
only if and to the extent that it is law according to rule. The rule that
likes be treated alike, then, is at the heart of the rule of law, because for
the rule of law to be conducive to liberty it must be both predictable and
rational. Obviously, the point of law, so understood, and of the rule of
law, is not to maintain bonds with the traditions of the past, but rather,
to increase the liberty of willful individuals. The moral point of legal
justice is to increase liberty through rendering the law and the
imposition of the legal sanction more consistent and hence predictable,
and the moral point of the rule of law is likewise to increase liberty as
well.
This libertarian understanding in tum suggests a distinctive account
of the human individual at the center of law's protection, different from
the traditionalist's. The individual for whom law exists gains identity,
meaning, and value, according to the libertarian, not through legally
preserved and differentiating traditional structures, but through freely
willed decisions facilitated by universal norms of freedom and
constraint. As is widely noted, his individuality distinguishes him from
the individual whose identity is forged through traditions: his willed
decisions, rather than social role, determine a unique, rather than social,
identity. Less noted, however, but perhaps more important, is that it is
by virtue of traits shared universally-his capacity to choose, his desire
and competence to do so-that this is so. The individual the chooser
decides to become defies tradition because of his unique particularity.
But the individual who so chooses defies tradition because of his
universalism: his individual and natural capacity for choice. What we
are, naturally, is free to utterly individuate, and we share that capacity
for utter individuation, universally.
This libertarian understanding of the rule of law, unlike the
traditional, does seemingly imply cosmopolitanism: the capacity for
choice which defines human life, on this account, and which
necessitates the rule of law, does not presumably stop at the borders. It
is, after all, human nature, not American nature, which confers upon us
our choosing, individualistic ways, and which prompts within us a
craving for the certainty and predictability which a stable rule of law

18.

See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 5, at 1178-79.
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promotes. There is, then, nothing to gain and much of value-indeed,
precisely, much surplus value-to lose, when this understanding of law
and of the individual is coupled with a nationalist rather than a
cosmopolitan understanding of law. Not just the commercial merchants
of antiquity, but modern consumers, employers and laborers as well
stand to profit from a universalized rule of law, if they are by nature
rational and choosing individuals and if the rule of law means, basically,
that individuals should be free and secure in their contracts. If the point
of law is contractual, the individual is a natural bargain hunter, and the
purpose of the rule of law is to provide liberty to such individuals
through order, then there is no good reason to understand the rule of law
as tied to national borders. On this view, the rule of law simply is the
rule of commerce which is by nature cosmopolitan-anti-traditionalist
and anti-nationalist both. The rule of law exists as an anti-traditionalist
force; as a weapon or tool of the choosing and free individual over the
stultifying and overly determining traditions of particularized culture.
Nationalism is just another traditional obstacle standing in the path of
the creation of both individual and worldly value, which the rule of law
in turn exists to facilitate.
It is, however, only a thin cosmopolitanism that this libertarian
understanding of the rule of law that it serves, sustains. Legal justice
understood as a condition of liberty demands of us a respect for the
universality of whatever human traits lead us to value and sustain a
robust rule of law-that is the sense in which a libertarian understanding
of the rule of law is cosmopolitan. But it then identifies only one traita propensity to choose rather than inherit one's identity-as universal.
When we view ourselves and all other world inhabitants as essentially
choosers, and hence potential contractors, and sovereign producers and
consumers, we not only ignore, repress, or deny the degree to which we
are-all of us-<:onstituted by particular traditional identities. We also
deny the degree to which we are constituted by traits or characteristics
other than a capacity for choice that are also universally shared: to name
a few, our physical survival needs for food and shelter, our sentient
nature, our capacity for pain as well as pleasure, our awareness of our
own mortality, our vulnerability to grief caused by the loss of those near
and dear, our delight in aesthetic experience, our capacity and desire to
create a shared culture, our experience, peculiar among mammals, of an
extended period of infantile dependence upon adults, and our shared
adult experience of comparably extended periods of nurturing the
young. This is the sense in which libertarian justice implies a "thin"
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cosmopolitanism. When we identify only our propensity to bargain as
universal and natural, and all else as cultural and constructed and
particular, and then ground our respect for and understanding of law in
that which is universal in our nature, then we wed law and the values on
which it stands to contract and pit it against all else. Not only contract,
commerce and capitalism, but law itself-the idea of law-becomes
committed to the denial of limits, derived from our material, sentient,
universal and essential human nature, on the domain of contract, and on
the sovereignty of consumer and producer choice.
This reduction of our nature to our capacity for choice, of law to
contract, of the rule of law to the craving for ordered liberty, and of
legal justice to a mandate of predictability, has arguably inhumane
consequences, and the thin cosmopolitanism it implies expands the
reach of that consequential inhumanity globally. When we identify law,
in essence, with contract, identify the rule of law and the mandate of
legal justice with the consistency and order needed to render contracts
reliable and the use of force predictable, and identify our universal
nature with our shared propensity to bargain, and then tie the rule of law
so understood to cosmopolitanism, then we pit law and respect for law,
both domestic and international, against whatever cultural or social
constructs-national, familial, communal or individual-that might be
created to respond to or serve these other aspects of our shared nature.
If our domestic environmental law, for example, is grounded not in a
recognition of a species-wide need for clean air and water, but in a
particular cultural and traditional preference, no more or less arbitrary
than another culture's preference for cliterodectomy or foot-binding or
dirty air and water, while our internationalized law of commerce is
grounded in a universal human trait, then eventually environmental law
itself, as well as the human needs it protects, will come to be perceived
as just as parochial and arbitrary and oppressive an obstacle to the full
lawful recognition and respect that ought be accorded our free, rational,
willful, and universal selves. Examples could be multiplied. If
domestic constraints on the permissible range of labor contracts are
grounded not in a recognition of species-wide needs, but in parochial
preferences of momentarily empowered groups, then those laws as well,
from a cosmopolitan perspective, are indefensible obstacles to a fully
realized legal order, rather than expressive of any aspect of law's
distinctive virtue. To generalize the point: if the virtue expressed by the
rule of law is our respect for universally shared human traits, which is
then identified exclusively with our capacity for willful choice, then the
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cosmopolitanism that the rule of law so understood implies, will be one
which runs rough shod not only over particular cultural traditions, but
also over legal regimes, either domestic or international, responsive to
and protective of other needs or traits or aspirations of the species. In
short order, it will be a cosmopolitanism that respects and serves the
interests of commerce, capital and markets, and one that is neglectful of
or hostile to not only particular cultural traditions, but non-commercial
universal needs and aspirations as well.
The difference between a traditional and libertarian understanding
of the rule of law, and of the human being ideally protected or
constituted by law, now dominates jurisprudential debate. It finds its
echo in the difference between nationalist particularity and economic
globalism that has come to dominate debate in international law and
political theory. These debates are logically linked. Traditional
understandings of the rule of law are rooted in a commitment to
particular and particularizing culture, and accordingly imply a strong
anti-cosmopolitanism, while libertarian conceptions of the rule of law
are rooted in an economic cosmopolitanism openly hostile to the value
of particularized traditions that impede individual choice. Such
libertarian conceptions are also, however, although less often noted,
equally hostile to legal or cultural constructs responsive to or protective
of universal traits, needs or ambitions, other than the essential human
capacity for choice. As the implications of this libertarian conception of
law are made explicit, and then reflected in the positive international
law that governs commercial transactions across borders, it has become
clear that the thin cosmopolitanism on which it rests-that humans, qua
humans, choose-is not the ethical cosmopolitanism that Nussbaum has
called for; indeed it is in many ways its antithesis. But so is the
traditional understanding of law-and the deep national and cultural
relativism it seemingly implies. The rule of law, and the virtue of
justice peculiar to it, if we look no further, is either hostile to ethical
cosmopolitanism or conducive to only an economic form of it that
proves in practice equally corrosive. We need to ask whether there is an
understanding of the rule of law that is supportive of rather than hostile
to Nussbaum's ethical cosmopolitan vision.
There surely is, although it is relatively undeveloped in
contemporary legal scholarship. The third response might be this: the
moral constraint imposed upon judgment by the mandate of legal justice
is neither a directive to preserve tradition, nor to ensure liberty, but
rather, it is a mandatory affirmation of the essential humanity of every
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individual embroiled in every case so decided. To treat like cases alike
is to treat the individuals involved as co-members of a community of
equals. To treat like cases differently, in effect, excommunicates the
differently treated: you are like us, but you can be treated differently,
because you are not one of us. That different treatment, in turn, creates
a dissonance that must be resolved: your different treatment must in turn
imply that in spite of surface similarities, in some deep way you are not
"like" us after all-you are not fully human. You are not one of the
"people" that can be hurt by steamboat collisions after all, in spite of the
fact that like us, you are obviously mortal and vulnerable to injury.
Once that point is reached, there is no longer a felt contradiction: likes
are being treated alike and unlikes are being treated differently and
appropriately so. But the dissolution of the dissonance has come at the
cost of excommunicating, and then de-humanizing, some sizeable
portion of the human community.
If this is the logic and consequence of injustice-if this is the
morally problematic heart of the different treatment of likes-then it
may be that the ethical content of the mandate of legal justice is to
affirm the opposite: by treating likes alike we affirm specifically
egalitarian and communitarian commitments. The mandate to treat likes
alike reminds us of the injustice of treating some persons as not one of
us because it serves our interest to do so, and then justifying the
different treatment, over time, on the dehumanizing grounds that the
excommunicated is somehow less than human-he is less than human
because he is not one of us. The insistence on legal justice and
horizontal equity might be, in part, one way, among others, we guard
against the sentiment expressed by Aunt Sally: the casual
excommunicating sentiment that "lucky for us only a nigger was killed,
because sometimes people do get hurt." Formal or legal justice can
be-although again, it doesn't have to be-understood as an insistence
that the circle of community-the community to whom we owe duties
of equal concern and respect-not be drawn narrowly.
So, to return to my examples, when we insist that the acquittal of
0.1. Simpson was unjust because likes were not treated alike, we may
be asserting that his acquittal dehumanized his victims and dehumanized
other less well off defendants charged with comparably violent crimes.
When we fear that the relative reluctance to sentence the killers of black
victims, as contrasted with the killers of white victims, to death is
unjust, we may be protesting the dehumanization of the black victimsnot advocating a broader use of the death penalty. When we argue that
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surrogacy contracts should be enforced, or that prostitution should be
legalized, or that housekeeping should be compensated, or that the value
of domestic services should be taxed, we may be urging that the failure
to do so has rested on a refusal to treat the providers of those services as
fully human-not that it is or would be a terrific thing to commodify all
aspects of human affairs. In each case, it is the apparent refusal to
include the outsider in the sphere of humanity that creates first the
unlike treatment of likes and then the taste of injustice. And, it is that
refusal to define community expansively, the departure, in other words,
from egalitarian and communitarian commitments-and not the
departure from tradition, or the diminution of individual liberty-that
drives our revulsion from the inconsistent judgment. It is unjust to
devalue the life of Nicole Brown, or the black victims of violent crime,
or providers of household, reproductive or sexual services. The
injustice rests, in each case, on the too narrow drawing of the circle of
humanity. In each case, likes have not been treated alike, and in each
case, what we mean when we say that, at root, is that someone has been
used and then excommunicated by our community of equals, eventually
perceived as less than human, and their differential treatment
accordingly justified by precisely the dehumanization and then the
differentiation that excommunication wrought.
The felt ethical mandate to treat likes alike, if this is right, may
stem neither from a desire to preserve tradition (either because they are
good traditions, or because such preservation is simply a good thing)
nor from a desire to maximize liberty by securing order, but rather, from
an egalitarian and communitarian commitment to the shared humanity
of all persons. It may not always have been so, but it may well be so
here, in this country, and today, at this time. Surely, the greatest
injustice that we have come to fear in ourselves, and the greatest
injustice that we see with shame in our history, and the greatest injustice
that we seek to guard against in our institutions, is the wrongheaded
insistence that some human beings are to be used by, rather than be an
equal part of, our community. Because they are not part of our
community of equals, they can be treated differently in spite of apparent
similarities, and because they can be so treated, it must then be the case
that appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, they actually do not
share in precisely those universal shared traits that make us human and
that mandate our, as opposed to their, equal treatment: they may share
superficially our human form, but they do not share our desire to be
free, or our vulnerability to grief, or our sensitivity to pain, or our love
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of family, or our maternal bonds with our children, or our delight in
higher mental pleasures, or our capacity for reason, civic deliberation, or
productivity. They are, accordingly, legitimately outside the community
of equals-not just because we want to oppress them-and hence can be
treated differently even in the face of their apparent likeness, and
without contradiction after all. Thus, their interests, desires and
preferences can be discounted even by an interest and desire driven
economy that purports to respect all interests and desires equally. They
can be disenfranchised even in a democratic polity the justification of
which rests on the free participation by all. Their lives can be casually
expended in a fight against global terrorism, the justification of which
rests on a need to counter the politically driven extermination of civilian
lives. And, all this unlike treatment of likes can happen without
hypocrisy or contradiction because those so unequally treated are simply
not members of the community of equals, hence not the same as us, and
hence not fully human. If that moral logic---drawing the circle of our
community of equals too tightly, precisely so as preserve the usability,
and hence the dissimilar treatment, of the lives of outsiders without
contradiction, while making judgments of egalitarian sameness within
it-is the greatest source of legal injustice, then the moral mandate of
legal justice might consist largely of the felt ethical imperative that we
not make such an error: that we not excommunicate some lives, so as to
put them toward the end of improving the quality of those lives within
the community of equals. We should be suspicious, then, not only of
claims that some but not others are members of our community of
equals. We should also be suspicious of the deadening logic to which it
leads: to claims of difference themselves traceable to the need to
excommunicate and use, rather than equally regard, the lives or services
of others. To guard against this, we should assume, and insist, and reaffirm, that those whose lives are affected by our actions are
fundamentally, essentially and in material, emotional and biological
ways like us, and act accordingly. The rule of law, and the mandate of
legal justice it implies, might be best understood today as a bulwarkinstitutional, to be sure, but also deeply ingrained in our nature-against
our human tendency to self-servingly do otherwise.
The point of law presupposed by this egalitarian and
communitarian understanding of the rule of law, is neither to preserve
tradition, nor to maximize individual freedom, but rather, to ensure the
preconditions for a community of equal individuals. Law itself exists to
ensure that we draw the circle of our civic concern broadly-not just
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around those human beings we would be naturally inclined to defend in
any event in a state of nature, whether defined by reference to family,
neighborhood, or nationalist ties. It exists to ensure that we act on our
capacity for recognizing the equal entitlements of all persons to our
considerate regard rather than act on our natural predisposition to
discredit those obligations. Law exists so as to ensure a civic fraternity
even when, or especially when, the obligations of such a fraternity
impose burdens on our differentiated, particularized, natural loyalties,
and whether or not those differentiated and particularized natural
loyalties find expreSSIOn in past traditions-cultural, legal or
constitutional. It exists so as to institutionalize our egalitarian and
communitarian convIctIOn that the excommunication and then
differential treatment of some for the exploitative use of others is not
justified, and can never be justified by the perceived or actual
differences which that excommunication and exploitation eventually
create.
A human being protected by the rule of law so conceived, is neither
the creature of tradition nor the stark potential for free will presupposed
and protected by traditional and libertarian accounts of the rule of law
respectively. A human being protected by a law that exists so as to
ensure the conditions of a community of equal individuals is a human
being in need, specifically of that law's protection. It is the human
being with material needs, emotional ties, cultural ambitions, and
intellectual aspirations that are frustrated, denied, threatened, or
annihilated by not only the natural wilderness, but also by the flow of
the unchecked antipathies and sympathies of extra- or pre-legal human
nature. It is the human being whose needs for survival are going to be
denied or unmet by an unregulated market economy that presupposes
only the universalizability, and hence rationality, of will, rather than
need. It is the human being whose maternalism is denied or crushed by
an unregulated social order hostile to the dependency and neediness of
mothers and children. It is the human being whose materiality and
mortality are ignored by a technologically advanced warrior society that
shields the eyes and hearts of its citizens from the evidence of the bodily
suffering and death that its aggression engenders. It is the human being,
with needs, capacities, ambitions, connections to others, and aspirations,
that is left outside of natural, societal, or traditional circles of concern
that in tum define that person, or that person's needs, as lesser, or as of
lesser moment. The "outsider," no matter what makes her such, simply
is the human being for whom the rule of law, understood as the
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guarantor of those conditions that sustain a community of equal
individuals, exists.
This egalitarian and communitarian understanding of the rule of
law strongly implies an ethical, rather than economic cosmopolitanism.
If we should treat likes alike because justice requires it, and if justice
requires it because doing so reaffirms our conviction that, by virtue of a
shared humanity, all humans should be equally regarded, and if we
sustain that conviction and institutionalize it in law precisely because of
our temptation to draw our circle of communitarian concern more
narrowly, then such a mandate obviously does not stop at our borders.
The mandate exists as an injunction to question both the coherence and
motivation of borders of exclusion, whether national or cultural. If we
should "treat likes alike" in law, because by so doing we create and
affirm a community of equal persons, then we obviously should be as
concerned with the justice or injustice of a dropped bomb in the Sudan
to fight international terrorism as we are concerned with the injustice of
a dropped bomb in Philadelphia to fight the domestic equivalent. These
are like cases. We should be as concerned with the lack of an economic
safety net around the globe in those regions making rocky transitions to
market economies as we are concerned with the lack of a safety net in
this country that might cope with the same economic trauma
experienced by American families. These are like cases. We should be
as outraged by the environmental costs and the lack of rights for
laborers entailed by the internationalization of contract law as we are by
the miseries entailed by a deregulated laissez faire regime in our own.
These are like cases. In all of these cases, our relative nonchalance in
the face of the evil visited on distant others, when contrasted with the
outrage we feel when the same evil strikes close to home, is an instance
of failing to treat likes alike. In all of these cases we reap the benefits of
the state policy in question by drawing a narrow circle of egalitarian
concern. Furthermore, in all of these cases of injustice, we profit. Like
Sally, we celebrate as well as enjoy the profits of industry and
commerce, while expressing the admirable concern that sometimes
people get hurt, and like Sally, we are secure in our knowledge that it is
other and distant and lesser lives, rather than real people, that pay the
price of our comforts.
Finally, this egalitarian and communitarian understanding of legal
justice, law, and the rule of law is thick, not thin. The individual who is
the proper object of the law's protection is not just a profit center
contingently attached to a biological brain and body that in turn contains
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a will to bargain. She participates in a universal nature both more subtle
and supple. She not only chooses, she also suckles, toddles, develops,
bleeds, menstruates, bears babies, lactates, nurtures her young, forges
ties with others, creates and preserves culture, sickens and dies. She
needs not only options from which to exercise her capacity for choice,
but also food, shelter, love, safe intimacy, and her community's support.
She not only becomes more individuated with every choice she makes,
she also becomes, with every passing day, older and sicker. She
progresses through life not toward a point of pure individuated will, but
toward death. A rule of law that accords her equal respect does not
simply honor her choices and the individual she becomes by virtue of
them. It honors her needs, interests, pleasures, pains, ties to others, and
passionate desires as well. It reflects and respects her particularity, both
cultural and individual, as well as her universality, rationality, and
potential freedom. It is mindful of her universal needs-needs that are
neither individually chosen nor traditionally or culturally constructedfor a clean environment, a supportive culture, loving and safe intimacy,
and respectful institutions. The equal person, regarded and protected by
an egalitarian and communitarian rule of law, is neither abstracted to
nor reduced to her capacity for rational choice. She is whole and
material, with needs and desires that include that contractual capacity
that go beyond and grow beneath it as well.
So to sum up so far, to whatever degree we can sensibly understand
our appreciation of legal justice as resting on egalitarian and
communitarian impulses rather than libertarian or traditional ones, then
our commitments to law, the rule of law and legal justice, entail a
commitment to universal cosmopolitanism as well. This should not be a
surprising result. The mandate of cosmopolitan justice does not, after
all, presuppose world government. It presupposes consequential acts of
power, and our national and individual acts vis-a-vis citizens in other
countries and are indeed consequential acts of power. When we
exercise power, we should do so mindfully and respectfully of the equal
worth of those we affect. This is the essence of the cosmopolitan case
for universalism. When we urge respectjor law, we do so in order to
ensure that this moral constraint of equal regard on our actions inures to
the benefit of precisely those persons to whom we are not easily
predisposed to grant it. If we fail to universalize this legalistic respect
for all, if we find in law an expression of our communitarian and
egalitarian commitments-but only with regard to those people we
include within our circle of concern-we sound like a virtual chorus of
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Aunt Sallies. Our legal texts that arguably commit us to the project of
making good on this ideal, for example, that no state shall deny any
person the equal protection of the law, does little but echo Sally's cruel,
albeit sentimental, bromide.
III. COSMOPOLITANISM, LEGAL EDUCATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW

Let me sum up. In her essay, Nussbaum argues that we should all,
by virtue of our identity as moral beings, embrace ethical
cosmopolitanism. We should, she suggests further, embrace this ethic
as a part of our cultural heritage, and we should reinforce the teaching
of it in schools. We should educate at least the next generation of
citizens to embrace its worldly obligations, even if we don't come
naturally to it ourselves. If what I have argued above is correct, then it
follows that the legal profession, to whatever extent it views the rule of
law as grounded in an equal regard for the moral worth of all human
beings, should embrace cosmopolitanism as part of its specific moral or
ethical identity as well. Are there any pragmatic reasons why this might
be wise? Is there any reason to think that lawyers might have a
distinctive and valuable contribution to make to a cosmopolitan ethic?
Is there any reason to think that lawyers might in turn have something to
gain by embracing cosmopolitanism as a part of their identity?
I think the answer is yes to these questions. Let me take them in
reverse order. First, lawyers should attend to the argument for
cosmopolitanism and should embrace its basic ethic primarily because
the internal moral logic of the legal profession demands it. The
egalitarian ideals we routinely express for the rule of law, in law day
speeches, commencement addresses, and catalogue copy-that the rule
of law respects the essential dignity, equality, and worth of all human
beings-are not borne out in practice, as is widely lamented. The utter
inapplicability of those ideals to human beings beyond our borders is
simply the most glaring and consequential lapse. In fact, it is a lapse
that is so glaring and consequential that it stretches cognitive dissonance
to its schizophrenic limit. We cope with the dissonance by rendering
those distant lives we use and then excommunicate invisible. We refuse
to see or reckon the maimed bodies and dead children brought on by the
bombs dropped in our name. We refuse to see or reckon the poverty
and misery directly occasioned by both our average standard of living
and our shared commitment to the patently absurd proposition that
unlimited, exorbitant and obscene wealth invariably enriches, and is
invariably constitutionally protected.
But these injuries do not
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disappear, nor do their traces in our legal consciousness. The
contradictions to which the jurisdictional limits we willfully impose
upon the reach of our egalitarian ideals lead, infect our law and our
relation to it both. There is neither nobility nor honor nor compassion in
Aunt Sally's sentimental concern for the people hurt by industry, since
her understanding of people excludes most of the human race.
Comparably, there is neither justice nor idealism in our expressed
concern for equality, nor for equal protection of the law where that
concern and the protection to which it leads extends to our kinfolk and
to nobody else.
And, what can law and lawyering bring to a cosmopolitan ethic?
Well, lawyers, for better or worse, are a powerful bunch of people, and
that is true no matter how much-and it is a lot-individual lawyers
deny it. The ideals lawyers hold and profess do in one form or another
find expression eventually in legislated, adjudicated or administrative
law. That law, it is now cliched but true to say, will, over the next
century, be increasingly global as our lives on this planet become
increasingly interconnected. What will be the consequence of our
failure to develop an understanding of the egalitarian root of our basic
legal commitments that resonate with Nussbaum's call for ethical
cosmopolitanism? Well, this much stands to reason: if we interpret,
understand and teach law as embodying, at best, traditional forms of life
and traditional understandings of justice, then the norms of international
law that will eventually emerge from such a consciousness will carry
with them at best a respect for traditional cultures-a tolerance, the
value of which is utterly dependent upon the goodness or harmfulness of
the traditional culture thereby protected. If we interpret, understand and
teach law as embodying libertarian understandings of justice, then the
international law that emerges will further the interests of capital,
wealth, and profit. If we forego entirely the responsibility to connect
our claim that there lies at the heart of law and legal justice a
distinctively egalitarian commitment, which in turn implies a
cosmopolitan appreciation of the moral worth of all of the world's
citizens, then the two polar opposites posited above-a relativistic
respect for cultural difference and a universal insistence on the leveling
sweep of contract and capital-will exhaust our alternatives, in
international law and in legal philosophy both. The result could be
catastrophic-for all the world's citizens.
Finally, the task implied by this argument-the work of elaborating
the connection between egalitarian understandings of justice and calls
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for ethical cosmopolitanism-should not be all that hard to do, for two
reasons. First, a good number of aspiring lawyers do view themselves
as egalitarians and ethical cosmopolitans both, or would, were the
nature of the beast made plain. Students come to law school for a host
of reasons, but many come because they care about justice, equality, and
the worth of our human community. And of the students so motivated,
only a very few, I would guess, think of justice as something owed only
to co-nationals, or of equality as something which characterizes only the
regard owed insiders, or of the community as defined by geographic
borders. That justice is something owed only to co-nationals, I believe,
is a lesson learned in law schools. It is not a prejudice brought to the
law school door.
Second, and more importantly, a large number of working
lawyers-in fact, the vast majority of the elite of the professionalready think and act as cosmopolitan citizens of the world, in either the
economic or ethical sense, and already view that worldly identity as
fully integrated with their legal identity. Private international lawyers
employed by transnational corporations or trade organizations, as well
as public human rights lawyers employed by human rights
organizations, nations, governments, or individuals, circle the globe,
dressed in their American Express cards, as they quite explicitly seek to
create a world without borders, united by legal ties of either commerce
or of a universal regard for human rights. If the rule of law implies
ethical cosmopolitanism, we need to democratize that integrated
identity, both within the legal profession and law schools, and to do so,
we need to integrate it into our core legal ideals as expressed by both
our jurisprudential understandings and our basic pedagogic curriculum.
We presently have spectacularly failed to do so. First, we have no
developed body of jurisprudential scholarship devoted to the task of
understanding the nature of legal justice, and of the scholarship that
does address the nature of the justice dispensed by courts, virtually none
of it develops a communitarian, egalitarian, and universalist conception.
This is shocking in its own right. But more pervasively, our curricular
choices also reflect a professional neglect that goes beyond the confines
of contemporary jurisprudential interests. Neither public nor private
international law is required at any United States law school, or taught
in the definitive first year program. Public law courses, such as
constitutional law, never begin with even a cursory examination of
international treaties, laws, or courts. The law of war is not taught in
any form at many law schools, nor is it widely recognized as a

HeinOnline -- 19 QLR 282 2000

2000]

IS THE RULE OF LAW COSMOPOLITAN?

283

substantive area of scholarship. The law of citizenship and immigration
law are increasingly although belatedly, recognized as important, but
nowhere are they regarded as central components of the law school
curriculum. Needless to say, nowhere do courses in legal ethics or
professional ethics include a sense of the ethical responsibility of
lawyers, qua lawyers, to non-citizens: those courses only very recently
have contained even a hint of a suggestion that lawyers owe anything to
anyone other than clients. Jurisprudence courses are even more
parochial at the turn of this century than they were at the turn of the last
one, as any examination of textbooks will reveal: increasingly,
jurisprudence courses are simply surveys of what we know best, and
that is American and twentieth century thought, from legal formalism
and realism, to legal process, to current debates surrounding
postmodernism and identity law and politics. Typically, no examination
is given to theories of law-usually but not always continental-that
explicitly theorize international legal obligations and organizations as
hierarchically superior to domestic. Even courses on the law of
equality, the Fourteenth Amendment, or civil rights rarely consider the
claims that might be based on a recognition of the moral equality of all
human beings, including non-citizens. These curricular choices, taken
cumulatively, go a long way toward defining the American lawyer's
distinctively parochial professional and moral identity. They are all, if
we take the egalitarian interpretation of the rule of law seriously,
seemingly indefensible.
They are also, however, changeable. We ought to change them,
and with all deliberative speed. The longer we fail to do so, the more
our high-minded egalitarian pronouncements-pronouncements on the
mandate of equality, the moral equality of all persons, the equal dignity
of all humans, the equal respect to which all persons are entitled, and the
equal protection which no state may deny-particularly when coupled
with our sincere thanks for our collective national good fortune-the
sheer luckiness of not being born in a part of the globe ravaged by
American industry or aggression-resemble the sentimental prattle of
Huckleberry's beloved Aunt Sally. That similarity, sameness, and
likeness ought to give us pause. It ought to make us change.
IV. OBJECTIONS: THE PERILOUS COMMUNITY OF EQUALS

Let me conclude by briefly addressing what I think are the most
salient objections that might be posed to my main thesis, to wit, that an
egalitarian and communitarian understanding of legal justice should
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commit us to ethical cosmopolitanism as well. To some degree these
objections overlap with traditional and by now well-rehearsed
objections to cosmopolitanism itself. Nevertheless, thinking directly
about the former may shed further light on the more well-developed
arguments surrounding the latter. There are four such objections that
warrant consideration.
The first objection goes to the nature of communitarianism. The
communitarian convictions, that I have argued ground an egalitarian
interpretation of legal justice, do not in practice, and might not even in
theory, engender a universal and equal regard for all.
Communitarianism often, maybe usually, and maybe by definition,
engenders a compassionate and egalitarian regard for a community's
insiders, but at the cost of those left out. And-this may be true in
theory as well as practice because of brute facts of human existence: the
altruism required to sustain community may only be possible when
accompanied by a disregard of or hostility toward outsiders. The
communal bonds of a family, after all, seem to bear this out: parenting is
altruistic and communitarian work indeed vis-a-vis the insiders in the
familial community, but vis-a-vis outsiders, it is profoundly selfish, as
evolutionary biologists tirelessly point out.
Likewise, perhaps,
communities do seemingly gain their identity as well as mutual comfort
through the accentuation and exclusion of difference. It is only, then,
this limited and decidedly non-universal compassion and egalitarianism
that might be codified in a community'S positive law. A community's
internal and self-regarding rule of law might well be egalitarian and
communitarian. But it is an egalitarianism and communitarianism that
is the very antithesis of cosmopolitanism.
This argument, if right, suggests a powerful objection to
cosmopolitanism as well. If communitarianism at heart divides the
world into us and them, then not just a communitarian rule of law, but
communitarianism itself, is the antithesis of a universal
cosmopolitanism.
It may, however, be the only form of
communitarianism of which people are capable.
Universal
communitarianism-or alternatively spaceship earth or the world
community, or any other formulation of the basic cosmopolitan idealmay be oxymoronic.
In sum, a rule of law grounded in
communitarianism cannot possibly sustain cosmopolitanism, and it is
doubtful the latter can be sustained in any event.
The second objection to an egalitarian conception of legal justice is
that it inevitably dissolves into a libertarian one, and that coupling that
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conception with cosmopolitanism will accordingly do little but pave the
way for global capitalism. If we identify the heart of legal justice as an
ethical mandate to accord an equal moral regard to all, and then identify
the grounds of that mandate as the nature we all share, but then cling to
the belief that what we share, essentially, is nothing but our capacity for
creating value through choice-a belief seemingly held by both the
libertarian right and the relativistic postmodern left-and we then urge a
cosmopolitan ethic that respects that universalism, we will have done
little but fuel an economic globalism that runs roughshod over both
particularistic tradition and universal human need. Similarly, if the only
consequence we see or care about, when evaluating the consequential
worth of a law or legal decision, is the economic value created or
diminished, then our domestic law, as well as our international, will
reflect the poverty of that self-understanding. We may create a world of
riches, but it might be a filthy one, as human needs for all but wealth go
unmet, and human aspirations for all but accumulation of satisfactions
go unfulfilled.
Libertarian conceptions of justice and the economic
cosmopolitanism they ground, the objection might proceed, do more
harm than good: they do harm both to valued traditions, and to noneconomic universal traits, needs, and aspirations as well. True ethical
cosmopolitans, then, might be wise to seek to reinforce those aspects of
our domestic law that do respect non-economic universal traits by
insisting on nation-state sovereignty against the encroachments of
global capitalism, even if that means aligning with a rigorously
traditionalist understanding of the rule of law.
An egalitarian
understanding of legal justice, like ethical cosmopolitanism itself,
invites the slippery slope into libertarianism. The flame is not worth the
candle, and is clearly not worth the fire the lit candle will ignite.
The third objection to an egalitarian understanding of legal justice,
and the ethical cosmopolitanism it might imply, is the objection put by
Dean Kronman: any such universalist view, Kantian or utilitarian,
denies that the moral imperative of law stems from law's organic root in
local geography and history, and hence denies the moral force of the
culture's distinctive legal identity. Our sense of law's obligatory moral
nature, then, is no longer attached to time, place, or history, and our
sense of ourselves, to whatever degree it is tied to our felt possession of
our own law, may then become similarly abstracted. To take a domestic
example: if equality demands that we integrate the schools, then
children will have to be bused, and we lose the organic root and comfort
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of the neighborhood school. Similarly, if the justice that law demands
of us requires an egalitarian global concern, then we will lose the
organic comfort of a law responsive to, pertaining to, and constituted by
our national neighborhood. We lose our attached, particularistic, legal
identity, and hence an important mainstay of our individual identity as
well. If we globalize our commitment to equality-based justice-if we
ground it in the shared human nature of all human beings, rather than in
the shared human nature of all Americans-we lose our understanding
of our own American law of equality as derived from and constituted by
our own American historical struggles. We lose our sense of ourselves,
then, as well as our law, as constituted by those struggles. The
Fourteenth Amendment and Mark Twain's masterpieces both, in some
important way, can no longer be claimed as binding upon us because
they are ours. We have disowned whatever normative force law has, by
virtue of being our law, and to that degree we have set ourselves
dangerously adrift.
The fourth objection, finally, is that raised by postmodernists,
identity theorists, and scholars of culture: if we identify the moral
imperative of the rule of law with our shared humanity rather than our
shared nationality, we run the risk, paradoxically, of underinclusiveness: we run the risk of embracing a wrongly static definition
of the human being and then only admitting the outsider to the extent
that she conforms to that static definition. We then run the serious risk
of undervaluing those traits we have excluded, leaving us wedded to a
purportedly universal but, in fact, impoverished conception of our own
essential humanity. If we identify the nature of the human being with,
in part, each individual's essential separateness, for example, and insist
that women, like men, are separate individuals, we run the risk of
excluding women who are not so demonstrably separate from other
human life because they are pregnant, and when we do that, we run a
high risk of undervaluing (to say nothing of under-compensating) the
work that accompanies reproductive labor. If we identify the human
being with purity or cleanliness, similarly, even if we acknowledge that
women are sometimes capable of achieving such a state, we may feel
utterly justified in excluding women who are menstruating, or lactating,
so long as we include them when they are not. In all of these cases, we
will have achieved the admirable goal of recognizing that women too
are rational, and that women might labor, pray, or deliberate even
though they do from time to time menstruate, or lactate, or give birth,
but we will have also defined as out of the reach of our concern the
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experiences of pregnancy, menstruation, and lactation, to say nothing of
childbirth itself. We will have achieved our gain in legal justice and
communitarian inclusion at the not-so-inconsiderable cost of postponing
for another day the work of both accommodating such persons, and
understanding the value of what is excluded: the biologic and
reproductive value of a human pregnancy, the symbolic, as well as
social, value of menstrual cycles and natural lactation. If we identify
the moral force of the rule of law with the value we place on traits or
capacities we all seemingly share, we blind ourselves to, and then
undervalue, the human experiences thereby excluded.
Much of Martha Nussbaum's scholarship, in my view, can be
sensibly read as detailed attempts to articulate how these objections or
related objections to egalitarianism and cosmopolitanism might be
overcome. Her work on cultural relativism, for example, defends
ethical cosmopolitanism against the complaint that it overly abstracts
and rarefies the human being, while her utilitarian critiques of
preference-based normative economics address the need for a thick
rather than thin understanding of the human being to whom we owe due
regard. Her engagement with the classics, in part, seems animated by a
desire to re-instill in our modem understanding of our particular cultural
heritage an appreciation of its universalist and egalitarian ethical
ambitions. By so doing, she goes a long way toward addressing the
complaint that universalism detaches us from our particular cultural
identity. I don't want to rehearse or expand upon any of those
arguments here, in part because I don't have the space, and in part
because I have tried to do so elsewhere. What I want quickly to suggest
instead, by way of closing, is that all four of these objections share a
common root: they abstract away from or simply ignore embodied
human beings, and their physical and emotional needs, cares and
ambitions, in favor of an identification of the human being law ought to
respect with disembodied traits. They all, for related reasons, eschew
narrativity as a method of achieving justice, and deny the importance of
what Martha Nussbaum calls our moral emotions to our moral
sentiments. They all, accordingly, invite a similar response. It may be
that the response to all four of these objections, in part, is that we must
not do that. If we want to insist upon a robust, healthy, and embodied
egalitarianism, it may be that what we need to do is keep our focus
where it ought to be, and that is on the embodied human beings, their
needs, their mortality, their vulnerability, and their sentient nature,
rather than on the mind, the will, or the potential for free choice, that it
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houses. And, it may be that the way to do so is through listening very
carefully to the stories people tell about their own and others' lived
experiences. Finally, it may be that only by doing so (and by doing
much else besides---of course) can we hope to approximate the moral
generosity that a universal egalitarianism and communitarianism
requires of us. But again, none of this should be surprising. It is, of
course, precisely that moral generosity that we must hope to instill in
others, if not in ourselves, if we have any chance of making real, instead
of dreamlike, the ethical cosmopolitanism that Martha Nussbaum has
urged. Now, let me re-examine the four objections I have raised above,
with these guidelines in mind.
First, does communitarianism really force a distinction between
insiders and outsiders, as its detractors claim, which, in turn, permits
egalitarian law within the community only by mandating unequal
treatment for outsiders? It might, but it might not-the objection may
rest on an overdrawn and overly-cramped pessimistic understanding of
the roots of altruism. The outsiders that an egalitarian conception of
justice might tempt us to exclude do, after all, share the same
propensity to bleed, hurt, please us, pain us, and shrivel and die as the
insiders, and they share as well their material separateness and physical
differentness from each other. Our bodies, unlike our cultures, remind
us of what we share, as well as of our uniqueness, our distinctiveness
and our material separateness from others. Listening attentively to the
narratives of and about these outsiders might quicken in us a moral and
sympathetic response to these shared sentient experiences. If so, the
outsiders might no longer be perceived as quite so far outside our circle
of concern.
Admittedly, much else must happen besides for a universalistic
cosmopolitanism or an egalitarian understanding of law to become a
reality. But it would surely be a mistake to dismiss the possibility of
such a transformation on the grounds that our moral-psychological
nature precludes it, if there is no firm reason to so believe. Our capacity
for sympathy is, of course, openly and notoriously dependent upon the
degrees of separation between the sympathizer and the person needing
help. It is simply question-begging, however, to resist exploring our
capacity for universal cosmopolitanism or egalitarian justice on that
ground: those degrees of separation may themselves be a function of the
cultural markers that permit us to discern them. It may be that the more
direct our perception of pain, and the less culturally demarcated the
person suffering, the less likely as well we are to discount it by
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reference to temporal or geographic markers of distance. When we see
a picture of a starving child, a dying soldier, or a grieving mother, if we
have no cultural indicators of that person's identity, our sympathetic
response is much less likely to be filtered through nationalist
identification. That sympathetic response, occasioned by narrative, is
certainly not sufficient to sustain a robust universalist
communitarianism, and the cosmopolitanism it implies. But it is
necessary, and since it is necessary, we should look with extreme
skepticism at the blithe and unsupported assumption that it is beyond
our psychic ability.
More generally, and as Professor Nussbaum briefly argues in her
response to critics,19 it may be adult acculturation, and nothing essential
to our capacity for moral action, that prompts us to differentiate between
objects of sympathetic response along nationalist lines. Children flinch
sympathetically at pain experienced by sentient creatures.
We
unquestionably learn as we grow to act on that sympathetic response in
a moral manner-we would not do it otherwise. But we also learn as
we grow to channel the flinch response itself. We learn, for example, to
channel it into directions compatible with the dictates of positive
authority-as the Milgrim experiments show. We also learn to narrow
our circle of concern, and to narrow it, eventually, as we absorb lessons
of citizenship, to our co-citizens. But we do not lose the ability to
respond in a universalistic manner to the suffering of those at a distance.
It can surely be squelched, but it can obviously be rekindled as well.
There is, in short, nothing in our nature that undermines the possibility
of a universalistic and egalitarian understanding of the reach of the rule
of law. That we currently tailor our moral sympathies to the dictates of
nationalism hardly shows that such a cribbed response is central to our
nature.
What of the dangerous ambiguity between libertarian and
egalitarian understandings of justice? Here too, the danger can only be
forestalled by insisting that it is the embodied human being,
sympathetically engaged, and not the value creating will, that is the
beneficiary of an egalitarian rule of law's protective reach. It is, for
example, our bodies' needs for sustenance, shelter, clean air and water,
and parental and companionate love that puts the lie to the simple
assertion that the commodification and exchange of labor for money is
always and invariably an exercise of freedom. Our bodies' maternal

19.

See Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 17.
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attachments prompt emotional bonds, and it is because of that fact that
contracts for the sale of reproductive labor seem so dehumanizing, or at
least ill-advised. Injuries to our bodies instill lasting and nonquantifiable trauma as well as uncompensable grief in those who love
us, and it is because of the distinctiveness, of that physical pain and the
emotional harms it leaves in its wake, that those injuries are so resistant
to commodification and compensation. Our bodies' sexualities and
sexual pleasures are deeply interwoven with our distinctive histories and
identities, and it is because of that tapestry of sex and sexual response
with personal history and physical identity that the commodification of
our sexuality seems suspiciously akin to the commodification of our
very selves. It is, in part, because of the irreducibility of our purest
pleasures to benefits, profits, and satisfaction, that we sense that
exchange, choice and the satiation of willed preference do not exhaust
the ways in which we create, or experience, value in life. More to the
point, it is because of the distinctively incommensurate and nonquantifiable nature of our experience of pain that we know that the
frustration of preferences among market options, whether packages of
convenience and risk, or packages of insurance, does not exhaust, or
2o
A focus on bodies
even approximate, our capacity for suffering.
underscores the universality of this incommensurablity. The body
defines the limit of the will, and a focus on its pains and pleasures, its
anguish and ecstasies, underscores the limits of the value reaped from
willed exchange. If we pay attention to the embodied human beings
affected by commercial exchange, we may be less inclined to
encapsulate (and then discount) their suffering as costs, to be measured
against the value enjoyed by the consumers of the industry and
technology that delivers their misery. 21
A sympathetic engagement with the needs and attachments of
human beings might as well ward off the danger that egalitarian justice
and the ethical cosmopolitanism it implies will lead us to an overly
abstract or detached sense of self and law. Real people, unlike choice,
preference, and free will, are material and earthy, and come with needs
for connection to other like-bodied creatures: appreciation of their needs
requires appreciation of the sub-communities in which those needs are
met. We may abstractly value the individual's free and independent
20. See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort
Compensation, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1567, 1573 (1997).
21. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE LJ.
1981, 2052 (I 998).
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will, but if the individual we value is an infant sucking its mother's
breast, we will value the mother, and the connection between them, as
well. And, if we value the connected mother and child, and understand
their dependence upon others, we will value their community, and the
connection between them, likewise. Our bodies' needs, through
infancy, parenthood and sickness, impress upon us, as our individuated
wills do not, the moral importance of acknowledging these natural webs
of interdependencies. A cosmopolitanism and a rule of law that keep
the focus on embodied human beings will not stray far from that
impression.
Finally, a sympathetic engagement with embodied human beings,
rather than an abstract regard for their universal essence, might help us
guard against the seductive attraction of an overly static and rarified
understanding of the human being that claims our just allegiance. It is
actual, physical human beings, with their differing propensities, shapes,
sizes, interests, pleasures, pains, degrees of connection, forms of
community, and plans of life, and not the abstract idea of the human, or
of the rational, that require the protective mantle of the rule of law. If
embodied and vulnerable natural human beings are whom we seek to
protect with law, then our understanding of what human traits we value
and why can remain open, as it should, as our appreciation of the
distinctiveness and universality of each other grow. We share a general
human form, and a general subjective capacity for pain, pleasure,
sorrow, joy, grief, sickness, and death. But that human form comes in
all sorts of configurations, as do the pains, pleasures, sorrows, joys,
grief, and sickness. To understand what is universal in us that demands
equal regard, we must understand-and sympathetically engage-what
differentiates us: to understand why something is hurtful to someone
else, I must understand the uniqueness of the experience if I am to then
respond sympathetically to what is universal in it. If I fail to understand
the uniqueness of it, I am acting arrogantly-but if I fail to appreciate
the universality of it, and to respond accordingly, I am simply acting
selfishly or boorishly, and, on a global scale, imperially. We need to
understand what is different, and respond to what is shared. It might,
paradoxically, be the body and its stories, better than the will and its
choices, that, when sympathetically engaged, impress upon us both an
understanding of what we share and a realization of what we don't, and
what we need to do to acknowledge the human dimension of the latter
as well as the former. It might, then, be our bodies and their stories,
sympathetically engaged, rather than our choices, that force upon us an
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acknowledgment not only of the universality of our legal duties and
obligations, but of the profound differences among the various shapes,
forms, and configurations of human life that prompt them, as well.
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